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In these models, delay occurs in a cycle time like
way: delay is caused by the time it takes for a worker
to process the pile of data messages on his/her’s
desk!
Instead we model management hierarchy by
focusing on departmental structure where the
capacity of a department is endogenous. Two
underlying assumptions provide the foundation of our
model.
First, that uncertainty causes delay in
processing data into information, thus queueing, and
second, that processing data becomes more difficult
when a manager is asked to process from a variety of
sources.
Costs are generated by the expense of staffing
departments and the opportunity cost of delay. We
assume that the hierarchy design corresponds to the
hierarchy with the cost minimizing structure. It is
assumed that data originates from the hierarchy's
roots called data sources where operations tasks are
actually performed by small workgroups and/or
equipment. Process scope is the number of data
sources that generate operating data that needs to be
analyzed. Higher level nodes in the hierarchy
correspond to departments staffed by managers who
process data from lower level departments, possibly
make decisions and then pass processed information
to the next higher level. A department is staffed by
multiple individuals and computing resources needed
to process incoming data and information. Typically
there are multiple departments at each tier, but at the
top, only one.
The capacity in each department is measured by
its processing rate, which is a function of the number
of staff and/or amount of equipment devoted to
information processing. These resources are costly.
Also, delays in processing data causes opportunity
cost. Short response times add value by helping a
firm make timely error-free decisions and respond to
coordination problems, while adjusting to changing
market conditions quicker and serving customers
faster. (See [3] for further elaboration of the value of
timely service.)
Queuing is a basic universal, physical process
in any productive system in which uncertainty in
arrival patterns or processing times exists, and is
understood to have significant economies of scale.
At data centers data is constantly produced, much of
it not informative, but issues arise requiring higher

Abstract
This paper studies a fundamental management
question: how does information economics affect the
organization of management? We view management
hierarchies as tree-like structures designed to
minimize real and opportunity costs related to
information processing and decision making. “Line”
production activities stand at the end nodes of a
hierarchy tree. Data from these bottom nodes are
processed and distributed to higher level nodes that
combine information from the lower nodes. The
question we ask is: “how do the real and opportunity
costs of information processing affect the tree”. We
solve for the optimal tree which includes the links
and capacity at each of the nodes. Models are
formulated on two underlying premises: complexity
costs arise due to processing different types of data,
and
queuing effects due to data arrival and
processing uncertainties create delay which is an
opportunity cost.

1. INTRODUCTION
Management systems are typically organized as
a hierarchy and exists to monitor, coordinate, control
and make decisions about productive internal
activities that lead to final products.
It is often
overlooked that these functions are information
intensive and the economics of information
processing has much to do with the design of
management hierarchy. My view is that management
hierarchy specifically exists to efficiently process
information. The goal of this paper is to better
understand how the economics of efficient
information processing affects the design of
management hierarchy.
Many research papers have generated insights
about principles of hierarchy design by focusing on
specific structural aspects, e. g. scale economies [1],
and organization for information processing [2], etc.
However unrealistic assumptions are made in this
literature regarding the process of information
processing. For example, it is largely assumed that
the basic organizational unit is a single individual
(thus is not scalable). Nodes in a hierarchy represent
“departments” with one manager! In this literature it
is most often assumed that the process of capturing
and processing data into information is deterministic.
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level interpretation and decision guidance. The
incidence of these occasions creates a flow of data
from the data sources upward into the hierarchy
where it needs to be processed. Randomness of data
arrival rates and processing times are more the rule
than the exception, introducing queuing which enjoys
economies of scale. Economies of scale encourage
efficiency by merging data flows and consolidating
information processing. In short, it is efficient to
reduce the number of departments per tier and
increase the number of data streams into above
departments. The effect is that the hierarchy
becomes flatter.
Without some effect offsetting the queuing
economy of scale, the optimal hierarchy will consist
of a single processor. This is because with flow
aggregation, one can minimize the processing
capacity required (subject to a service time
constraint) with a single very large processor serving
a very high incoming data rate. But it is more
realistic to assume complexity related costs: a superadditive cost structure with respect to scope to
processing data from a variety of sources. Simply
stated, when the number of direct reports to a
department rises, management difficulty rises
because it takes effort to switch from task to task.
Increased management difficulty causes delays in
processing data. That might be ameliorated by more
processing capacity.
But that is the tradeoff we
study: the cost of delay versus the cost of capacity.
Because it is generally efficient to limit the
number of data streams into departments, higher
management levels are needed to fully internalize the
effect of all production units on the other production
units. That is, to glean information and makes
decisions that affects many data sources. Thus the
hierarchy gets taller.

specialized work which seems intuitively reasonable.
In many papers the opposite is claimed: see [4] and
[5]. Also, as one moves upward in the hierarchy, the
capacity allocated to each department rises while the
aggregate capacity at each tier falls, which is in
agreement with many existing papers.
Due to queuing, utilization and delay falls as one
ascends tiers.
This means that the effective
workload of higher management is less than at lower
tiers. We find that higher level departments have
more subordinates.
General patterns emerge for changes in
department structure with changes in structural
parameters. With increased scale (that is, data flow
rates) or process scope (number of data) the number
of tiers in the hierarchy rise, but at a decreasing rate.
Capacity cost per unit output has only a second order
effect on hierarchy height. A similar statement can
be said of data flow. Analysis and examples show
that increasing the delay cost rate per unit time (or
reducing the cost of processing capacity) causes the
hierarchy to shrink. Intuitively, higher delay cost
reduces the relative importance of capacity cost
which causes more capacity to be employed and the
number of subordinates to rise for all departments.
This increase in subordinates implies that there are
more departments at remaining tiers, but the increase
can be small. In an example we show that even with
a 4-fold increase in the importance of delay, the total
capacity employed rises by a small amount (for
example a 10% increase) and the number of
departments at remaining tiers is only slightly greater
than before.
Many factors cause more specialization.
Specialization refers to processing a narrower range
of data types coming from data sources.
A
department’s specialization increases with higher
data flow rates, higher complexity cost, higher delay
cost, and larger process scope. However, unless one
of these factors changes a great deal, the general
departmental structure (and thus specialization) does
not change much. Instead changes in these factors
cause the allocation of capacity to shift greatly.

1.1 Summary of results
Our analysis predicts how information
processing influences the hierarchy's shape. Among
the results are that large increases in information
processing cost/unit and large increases in data flow
rates don't change the hierarchy's departmental
structure very much but greatly affect capacity
allocation decisions for departments. Process scope
diseconomies exist when data sources are few, but
this changes to scope economies with many sources.
The implication is that decomposition of the
hierarchy into smaller sets of data sources is
inefficient.
We show that the number of subordinates of a
department increases as one rises in the hierarchy.
Increasing span means higher level managers do less

2. MODELS OF HIERARCHY
A hierarchy is a topological tree where all nodes
except those at the bottom correspond to informationprocessing departments, and the bottom nodes are
data sources. Nodes correspond to department which
is where data processing occurs. Departments pass
information upward to departments higher up. This
process of receiving and processing data, and then
passing it upwards in the hierarchy continues until
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Thus, the otal delay time to process data from source
to apex is just 𝐿 = !!!
!!! 𝑙!
We denote the cost rate of capacity by 𝐶! ,
and the cost of delay per unit time by 𝐶! . Table 1
lists the notation we use in this paper.

Tier 0, Supervisory
Department

0

1
𝑙! = 𝜇        1 	
  .	
  
𝑖    −𝜆
𝑠𝛿 𝑥

	
  

there is just one department at the top of the
hierarchy. Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchy.
The shape of a hierarchy can be described by the
number of tiers or levels of management, each
department’s span of control and each department’s
processing capacity. If the span of control is large for
each department then the hierarchy is flatter and
decisions are made faster but at the cost of extra
capacity due to added complexity. In contrast, a
hierarchy that is “taller” exhibits the opposite
advantages and disadvantages. Hence, the costs
incurred in an information-processing hierarchy are
highly associated with its shape.

Tier I, n Data Sources

FIGURE 1: A Hierarchy
Other	
  
variables:	
  

2.1. Model setup
We assume a symmetric hierarchy as shown in
Figure 1. Data is generated by random events
according to a Poisson process with rate 𝜆  where
larger 𝜆 means higher data flow rates need to be
processed. The time delay is the total time for the
data to traverse from the bottom to the top of the
hierarchy. The number of departments (or data
sources at the bottom level) of each tier i is denoted
by 𝑥! and the span of control of each department at
tier 𝑖 is denoted by 𝑠! . Each department at the 𝑖 th tier
receives 𝜆 ∗ 𝑠!!! data signals per unit time from its
subordinates Time to process data is assumed to
follow an exponential distribution.
At each
department, time delay is modeled as an M M /1 queue.
Rate 𝜇 is the total data processing rate at tier  𝑖 and is
our measure of capacity. Thus, the capacity per
department is 𝜇 𝑥. The effective processing rate of
each department is reduced by the complexity of
arriving work. Complexity is set by the number of
subordinates a department serves, say, s and also a
parameter 𝛿: 0 ≤ 𝛿 ≤ 2.      𝐴 department’s effective
processing rate is 𝜇 𝑥𝑠𝛿 . If at tier i, there are 𝑥!
departments each with 𝑠!   subordinates and the
capacity has been set to 𝜇! ,   then, the time delay at
each department at tier i is just
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Total cost is the weighted sum of capacity cost and
delay cost over the hierachy's I tiers:
	
  
𝑇𝐶 = 𝜆𝐶! 𝐿 + !!!
!!! 𝐶! 𝜇! .	
  
The number of departments in each tier i can
be expressed as 𝑥! = 𝑠! 𝑠! 𝑠! … 𝑠!!! .
Given
equations and (1), the total cost when there are 𝐼 tiers
in the hierarchy is
!!!

𝑇𝐶 =
!!!

𝜆𝐶!
𝜇!
1
𝑥! 𝑥!!! /𝑥!

!

+ 𝐶! 𝜇! .

−𝜆

The total cost function is concave in 𝜇! , ∀𝑖 .
Minimizing the total cost with respect to 𝜇! gives the
cost minimizing 𝜇! as
!
	
  
!
!!! !! !!!
!
!!
!
(2) 	
  
𝜇! =
+ 𝑥! !!! 𝜆	
  .	
  
!
!
!

!

As is shown, capacity choice is a variable that is set
by the number of departments. Thus, this equation
by itself cannot deliver insightful insights.
If one substitutes the expression for optimal 𝜇!
back into the total cost function it appears that total
cost is expressed as
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2.1 Analytical Results and Illustrations
Theoretically speaking, solving the equation system
of (5.1) to (5.4) will give the solutions to 𝑇 and 𝑥 𝑡 ,
for the optimal hierarchical structure. We start with
studying the Euler equation. Substituting (4.3) in
equation (5.1) gives

in can be

𝜆𝐶! 𝐶! ! ! !
𝑥′ 𝑡
𝑥 ′′ 𝑡 𝑥 𝑡 − 𝑥 ′ 𝑡 !
𝑒 ! ! 2−𝛿
− 𝛿!
  
𝑥 𝑡
𝑥 𝑡
𝑥 𝑡 !
′

Differentiating

both sides with respect to t gives 𝑥 ′ 𝑡 =
δ
𝑥 𝑡 𝑙𝑛 𝑠 𝑡 .
We replace ( xi+1 / xi )
with

xi

!′ ! !
! !

This problem satisfies sufficient conditions for a
solution to exist. Equations (5.1) and (5.2) are the
Euler equation and the transversality condition,
respectively. Substituting (4.1) in equations (5.1) and
(5.2) gives two equations in 𝑥 𝑡 , 𝑥 ! 𝑡 , 𝑥 !! 𝑡 , and
𝑥 ! 𝑇 . Accompanied by equations (5.3) and (5.4),
numerical methods can find 𝑥 𝑡 . However, analytic
results can be obtained from the problem formulation
as we show next.

can be rewritten in the form ln  (𝑥! ) =
Accordingly, in the continuous representation it

ln  (𝑠 𝑡 ! ) and the rest of

=	
  

𝑓−𝑥 𝑡
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!
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𝑢 𝑑𝑢 .
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In this section, we drop the integer constraints and
solve the hierarchy design problem by using a
continuous-tier approximation. We use the positive
real number 𝑡 instead of integer 𝑖 to represent the
number of tiers in the hierarchy,   𝑥! and 𝑠! are
replaced by 𝑥 𝑡 and 𝑠 𝑡 and I become T. The
number of departments at tier I in the integer

becomes ln 𝑥 𝑡 =

4.2	
  

And x(t) and 𝑇 are a decision variables.
Referring to section 9 in [6], our problem belongs
to the category of calculus of variations problems
with free horizons, that is, 𝑇 is free and 𝑥 𝑇 is fixed
at the value of 𝑛 . The optimal solution satisfies the
following conditions:

(3.1)	
  

2.2. Continuous-tier approximation

!
ln 𝑠
!

𝑓 𝑥 𝑡 , 𝑥′ 𝑡
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(3.4)	
  

= s0 s1s2 ...si−1 and
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𝑥 0 = 1, 𝑥 𝑇 = 𝑛	
  ,	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

Subject
to

This is an open-ended calculus of variations problem
with 𝑥! being the state variable and 𝑠! the control
variable.
Optimal hierarchies can be found by direct
computation of all the possible hierarchy designs.
Although in principle this sort of computation can be
done, this approach does not lead to general
analytical insights. Instead, to do so we apply a
continuous-tier approximation to the hierarchy design
problem.

representation is just xi

∫

t=0

!!

as the cost of capacity and time delay at tier 𝑖. Note
that 𝑥! = 1 and 𝑥! = 𝑛 . Additional integer
constraints are imposed on the decision variables.
The resulting integer optimization problem can be
expressed as follows:

	
  

T

minT ,x(t )

+ [2𝜆𝐶!
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𝑒!!
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−
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𝑥 𝑡 !

(8) 	
  

1−𝛿

!

]
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with x(t) implying

Moreover, substituting (4.3) in the transversality
equation (5.2) gives the boundary condition

. Thus, the continuous form of our

problem is as follows:
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−

𝜆𝐶! 𝐶! 𝑛𝑒

!′ ! !
!

+ 𝜆𝐶! 𝑛𝑒

!′ ! !
!

𝑥′ 𝑇 𝛿
= 0,
𝑛

	
  
which can be simplified to:
0

!

𝐶𝑐 = 1
𝛿 = 1.5
𝜆=1

] = 0. (7)

For fixed n, we seek the optimal function x(t) and
tier height T but these equations have no closed form
solution. But this system can be solved numerically.
The following propositions describe the
hierarchy and are presented without proofs which are
found in [7].

4

Capacity at each tier

Number of
departments at
each tier
Tier

𝑛 = 50	
  
𝑛 = 100
300

Proposition 1.: The number of departments at
each tier convexly increases from the top to the
bottom of the hierarchy,  𝑥 ′ 𝑡 > 0, and
  𝑥 ′′ 𝑡 > 0.

100

1−

!′ ! !

𝐶𝑤 = 1

2

!′ ! !
!

𝑥′ 𝑇 𝛿
𝑛

0
50

+[𝐶! 𝑛𝑒

2−

100

!′ ! !
!

200

𝜆𝐶! 𝐶! 𝑛𝑒

FIGURE 2: The graph demonstrates that when the number
of data sources differ, common tiers from the top possess
identical department sizes and capacities.

Proposition 2.: The span of control falls from
the top to the bottom of the hierarchy:  𝑠 ′ 𝑡 < 0.

It turns out that capacity is so effective at reducing
delay at higher tiers that the utilization of
departments (and its workers) actually falls as one
ascends the hierarchy.

Proposition 1 suggests the “trumpet-like” department
structure as seen in Figure 2. Intuitively, the number
of departments falls as one ascends. Insight can be
gained by considering that a unit of capacity reduces
delay much more at the top of the hierarchy than at
any lower tier. At each tier, any added capacity must
be divided up among the departments, thus there is
less “division” higher up and each department will
get more.
Thus, it is rational to allocate
proportionally more capacity to departments higher
up, which in turn allows the departments to
efficiently process data from more subordinates.
Thus the number of subordinates in the hierarchy
rises as one ascends.
As to the capacity in an optimal hierarchy, the
following proposition generalizes how capacity is
allocated at each tier.

Proposition 4.: The utilization of each
department falls as one ascends the hierarchy.
Given that the capacity cost at each tier is the same
and is a proxy for wages, the result states that
managers at higher levels actually work less
intensively than lower level supervisors. Intuitively,
utilization falls because reducing delay at the top is
less costly than doing the same at lower levels. In a
queuing system, reducing delay is equivalent to
lowering capacity utilization). On the contrary, many
papers in the literature assume high tier managers
earn a higher wage rate than lower tier managers, and
this effect increases the utilization as one rises. This
does not occur in our model: at higher tiers, the
increasing number of subordinates convexly raises
the effective cost of processing data. It is clear that
the current pattern will be reversed if the wage rates
rise steeply enough with tier. But, with a steep wage
profile by tier, the subordinate count and the delay
will be lower than if queuing phenomenon is ignored.
Next, we study how the shape of the optimal
hierarchy changes with increased process scope.

Proposition 3.: The capacity per department
rises and the total capacity at a tier falls from
the bottom to the top of the hierarchy.
A higher level department is endowed with more
capacity because it has to coordinate more
subordinates.
Increased complexity reduces
information-processing efficiency, thus requiring
more capacity.

5
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product mix is constant, as the number of production
centers increases, time delay becomes only a small
portion of the hierarchy control cost and becomes a
minor factor in hierarchy design when process scope
is large. It is this factor which caused past papers to
find that the average cost declines with process
scope. That holds true here but we also consider
economies of scale of queueing.

Proposition 5.: When process scope (n)
increases, then the optimal number of tiers of a
hierarchy concavely increases and the total
capacity, total time delay, and the total cost of
capacity and delay increase. The average cost
first increases and then decreases with the
process scope. Further, the existing optimal
hierarchy of an organization retains its shape
and becomes the top portion of the new
hierarchy when the process scope increases.
This positive relationship between the number of tiers
and the process scope is not surprising and has been
shown empirically and theoretically. The number of
departments at each tier and the capacity allocated to
each tier fall from the top to the bottom tier. An
example of these properties is illustrated in Figure 2
where the y-axis represents the tier number, the left
x-axis reports the total capacity by tier, and the right
x-axis reports the number of departments by tier. In
addition, the figure shows that the optimal
hierarchical structure retains its relative shape even
when the scope increases. In Figure 2, if the scope is
reduced to 𝑛 = 50, the shape of this smaller
hierarchy is identical to the top portion of the original
larger hierarchy above the dashed horizontal line.
The number of departments and the span of
control at each tier of a smaller hierarchy are the
same as those at the corresponding tiers in a larger
hierarchy.
Figure 3 presents analysis of average cost against
process scope (n). The average cost illustrated by the
upper curve in the figure indicates that the cost
exhibits diseconomies of scope when the process
variety is very small and economies of scope at high
process scope. We note that both average capacity
cost and average delay cost have this property. The
average delay cost and the average capacity cost have
been drawn with a fixed number of subordinates.
The graph shows the adjustment in average total cost
when an optimal subordinate structure is applied.
Given the assumptions of this section, it can be
concluded that if a firm is operating at high process
scope levels, from an information economics
viewpoint it is inefficient to divide the organization
into subunits that are focused on subsets of processes,
or in other words, becoming process focused. Such
subdivision is paradoxically possible at low scope.
One more observation can be gleaned from
this figure: as process scope increases, total delay
cost becomes less and less important in hierarchy
design. This intuitively follows since delay cost is
not weighted by the magnitude of scope. When the

FIGURE 3: The graph shows that for a small number of
data sources (n), the average cost rises (diseconomies of
scope), especially for capacity cost, but for large process
scopes, economies prevail as the average cost declines.
The graph also captures the change in average cost due to
changes in the optimal subordinate structure.

The structure of a hierarchy is also shaped by data
flow scale (𝜆). When scale changes, an organization
restructures its hierarchy. The following proposition
characterizes the impact of scale.

Proposition 6.: With an increase in the scale
(𝜆), the optimal number of tiers concavely
increases and the total capacity, total delay, and
total cost increase. Capacity at the top tiers
strictly increases while the span of control falls
and because tier capacity increases, utilization
falls. Because the span of control falls, there
are fewer departments at each existing tier.
Average cost falls due to economies of scale of
queuing and reduced complexity at incremental
tiers thus scope economies exist.
Higher scale implies that at corresponding tiers there
will be fewer subordinate departments resulting in
more specialization and more tiers.
Figure 4 shows that with a ten-fold increase in
scale, the number of tiers increases only
slightlyFigure 4 shows that with increased scale there
is a small shift to specialization. Figure 5 shows that
the number of department in a tier gets smaller with
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10

lambda =1 and 10 for figure.nb

Proposition 7.: When complexity level (𝛿 )
increases,]} the optimal number of tiers increases and
the total capacity, the total delay, and the total cost
of capacity and delay increase	
  

larger scale and that the hierarchy height only
increases
[% a small amount.
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FIGURE 4: Impact of the data flow rate on the span
of control.
Specialization of departments does increase, but
40
note how little the number of subordinates fall with a tenfold20volume increase. This indicates that there are limits to
specialization with scale increases.
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In order to counter the effect of increased complexity
cost the organization shrinks the span of control and
adds capacity to the resulting departments. Increased
complexity level, 𝛿 , leads to a taller and narrower
hierarchy with more specialization at all tiers.
Interestingly, total cost is approximately linear in
parameter 𝛿.

40

20

High delay
cost

456.5

Cost
($)

TABLE 2: The delay time, capacity and cost for optimal
hierarchies under different structural assumptions. The
percentage is a column computation: the fraction of the
"base case" number in that column.

100 Number of departments at each tier

60

42.8

Capacity
(units)

6

FIGURE 5:
Impact of scale on number of
departments. This graph demonstrates that the general
shape of the hierarchy in terms of number of departments
does not change radically with the volume of data. At each
tier the number of departments for the λ=10 case falls
compared to the λ=1 case.

The optimal hierarchy is also shaped by the
relative importance of the two types of costs, the
delay cost and the capacity cost. The following
proposition illustrates how the number of tiers
changes with the ratio of these two costs, 𝐶! /𝐶! .

That large shifts in the flow rate cause small changes
in hierarchy height will be an effect later observed
with the cost parameters,  𝐶! , 𝐶! .
Table 2 reports data comparing performance
when 𝜆 = 1 and when 𝜆 = 10. In this example
n=100 and when the data flow increases from 𝜆 = 1
to 𝜆 = 10 total capacity and total cost increase by a
factor of 8.8 demonstrating economies of scale.

Proposition 8.: The optimal number of tiers
increases with the ratio, 𝐶! /𝐶! .
The proposition implies that as the cost of delay (the
cost of capacity) becomes larger (smaller), the
optimal hierarchy becomes flatter and the number of
departments at each level falls. Spans of control
increase, reducing specialization and hierarchy
height. Higher delay costs cause capacity cost to in
effect become relatively smaller causing an increase
in capacity in the remaining tiers. Figure 6 shows the
distribution of capacity and Figure 7 compares the

The complexity of information-processing and
coordination is captured by the parameter  𝛿 and we
explore how the magnitude of this parameter affects
the optimal hierarchical structure, which is
characterized by the following proposition.
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very much. Many have ascribed the flattening of
firm’s hierarchy to the development of cheaper
information processing. Here we show that is not the
case. We have shown that re-optimizing the hierarchy
Data independet redone 7.27 Cw=4 fig.nb
23
with lower capacity cost or higher delay cost rates
cause only a small reduction in height. Instead we
7
posit that other management changes better explain
this pattern. For example, introducing decentralized
6
decision making can be shown to cause dramatic
5
reduction in hierarchy height.
4
2.
As the number of data sources increases,
3
FIGURE
6: Distribution of capacity when 𝐶! = 1  (𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑)
additional tiers are added to the hierarchy with little
and2 when 𝐶! = 4   𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 .     The capacity in each tier
change in the number of departments in the existing
rises significantly when the delay cost rate is multiplied by
1
tiers. The implications follow: consider a firm that
4.
merges with another or otherwise increases the scope
50
100
150
200
of its activities. Our model indicates that the top of
[%
{
[ (
) ]
[
( ) ]}the new organizational structure will tend to follow
{
[ ]}]
the existing hierarchy's departmental and staffing
Number of tiers (T)
structure. New layers are added to the bottom of the
7
hierarchy where the bulk of the new staff will reside.
6
Management layers will be added above the direct
5
supervisors of production but below the bulk of
4
existing departments. On the other hand, outsourcing
3
or introducing integrated production equipment that
2
allows consolidation of data sources has the opposite
1
effect. We predict the bottom tiers of management
n (Number of production centers)
50
100
150
200
will be pared. This is a striking insight into the
[%
{
[ ]
[
]}
disappearance of middle management
FIGURE 7: The number
of
tiers
vs
the
number
of
data
[
]
3.
We found that large increases in data
{
[
]}]
sources
when
𝐶! = 1  (𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑)
and
when
volume cause a relatively small increase in hierarchy
Number of hierarchy
for n data
sources
𝐶!Tiers= 4   𝑑𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑
.  Intiers
this
example
the number of tiers with
height and even a small decrease in the number of
n data
sources does not fall much when the delay cost rate
7
is multiplied
by
4.
departments at each existing tier. The major change
6
is a significant rise in staffing levels at each
5
tier structure for n data sources when 𝐶! =1, and
department. Interestingly, our model predicts that
4
capacity utilization will drop at all existing tiers.
when 𝐶! = 4. As expected the number of tiers falls
3
That is, managers will be less busy in order to make
for all values of n but this change is small. Table 2
2
faster decisions.
reports that the net effect of a quadrupling of delay
1
4.
A department at a higher tier than another
cost is that delay drops by approximately half with an
n
has
more
capacity and operates at lower utilization.
increase in50total capacity
of
10%,
and
an
increase
in
100
150
200
The utilization is lower in order to speed up control
total cost of 17%. Capacity resources formerly at the
activities. As a result, managers at higher tiers make
lower tiers are shifted upward to the remaining ones,
faster decisions than lower ones and have more
and 10% additional capacity is added. Decreased
resources available to facilitate decision-making.
capacity cost makes unit delay cost relatively more
Higher level managers also have more subordinates,
important, and results in effects like those described
thus their work is less specialized than those below.
above.
As in the discussion about scale, the
The supervisors at the lowest level have the fewest
departmental structure changes little but capacity is
subordinates. This seems reasonable by the criterion
shifted significantly.
of common sense. However some may argue that
this prediction only holds if one ignores the very high
3. MANAGERIAL INSIGHTS
wages earned by the very highest executive officers.
It is true that a very steep convex increasing wage
This paper contributes to the literature in
rate as one ascends can reverse the prediction. We
information systems in analyzing the implications of
would argue that the top of an executive organization
information processing on how a firm is organized.
might follow that pattern, but in operating
1.
Large increases in the cost of delaying data
organizations wage profiles are not as steep.
processing do not affect the departmental structure
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5.
Many factors cause more specialization of
control in departments, that is, fewer subordinates:
higher data flow rates, more complexity in processing
varied data sources, higher capacity cost, and less
emphasis on delay.
6.
Although delay cost is an opportunity cost,
capacity cost is captured by a firm's managerial
accounting system, and is manifest in the
organization's overhead cost for control. Conjectures
about shifts in control overhead are suggested from
the examples found in Table 2. Economies of scale of
capacity cost are demonstrated throughout, thus the
control associated overhead rate will decline with
scale. A large increase in the delay cost rate raises
expenditures for "management capacity costs", but
our examples show that these costs if measured as
overhead may rise only moderately.
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